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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Some philosophers of fiction – most famously Jerold Levinson1 - have tried to argue 
that fictional narrators can never be identified with real authors. This argument relies 
on the claim that narration involves genuine assertion (not just the pretense of 
assertion that lacks truthfulness) and that real authors are not in a position to assert 
anything about beings on the fictional plain - given that they don’t rationally believe 
in their existence.  
     This debate on the status of narrators depends on the idea that fictional beings and 
beings in the real worlds reside, as it were, at different levels. The assumption that 
there is a gap separating the levels of fiction and reality serves as a rationale for the 
claim that real authors could not possibly be en rapport with the fictional characters 
that they create (e.g. entertain beliefs about them, etc.).  
     While, intuitively, the notion of different levels of fiction seems to make a lot of 
sense, it is anything but clear that we have a firm grasp on it.  
     In section II of this paper, I shall try to shed some light on the elusive concept of 
different fictional levels. Since I take it to shape our understanding of what is often 
called “fictional universes”, every philosophical theory about fiction (and fictional 
universes or worlds) should make room for a hierarchy of different fictional levels.   
Finally, In section III, I will suggest that making sense of fictional levels imposes 
certain constraints on modal theories of fiction, i.e. theories that identify fictional 
                                                 
1
  Levinson (1996), p. 252. 
JOHANNES SCHMITT 
 
 35 
worlds with possible worlds.2 I will point in the direction of a strategy that would 
allow such theories to account for the phenomenon. 
 
II.  WHAT ARE FICTIONAL LEVELS? 
Suppose someone asks you: “Do you think Tony Soprano met Joe Bonanno?”  
You don’t know whether you should be amused or annoyed by this blunder. You 
proceed to inform your interlocutor that Joe Bonanno was an infamous American 
mobster (deceased in 2002) and that Tony Soprano is a fictional mobster. “They 
couldn’t have met”, you say, “the one is a real mobster, the other one is just a fictional 
character”. Everyone agrees that what you say is true. Introducing fancy philosophical 
jargon, we can construe your answer to the question as follows:  
 
(i) Tony Soprano and Joe Bonanno are not at the same fictional level  
 
I do not wish to claim that we actually phrase our answer to the question about Tony 
S. and Joe B. in terms of fictional levels. But I do want to suggest that accepting this 
construal – the fictional-levels-construal - will do some important philosophical work.  
For one thing, the construal explains why the presupposition made by the initial 
question seemed incoherent: people at different levels cannot really interact. But at the 
same time (i) is weak enough to explain why it is not at all absurd to assent to (ii)3: 
 
(ii)     While they are both violent and ruthless criminals, Tony Soprano and Joe 
Bonanno are also loving parents  
 
What do I mean by “weak enough”?  
Well, one might suggest a different construal and say that (i) is just a tediously 
obscure way of making either of the two following statements: 
 
(iii)  One of the two individuals, namely Tony, does not exist 
                                                 
2
  By “a modal theory” I understand any theory that equates fictional worlds with possible worlds and 
truth in a fiction with truth at a world, regardless by what mechanism that world is picked out (that 
mechanism varies according to Lewis’s two proposals, Analysis 1 and Analysis 2.) – Cf. Lewis (1983). 
Currie offers some important criticisms of the “nearest world” approach to truth in a fiction – Cf. 
Currie (1990), p.66. For a more recent defense of Lewis’ theory, see Hanley (2004). 
3
  This is not to say that (ii) may not ultimately turn out to be false. Whether or not it is false, a theory 
should explain why we are tempted to assent to it.  
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(iv)  Comparing Tony Soprano and Joe Bonanno involves a category mistake 
 
But both the “deflationist” reading4 (iii) and the category mistake- reading (iv) make it 
extraordinarily hard for their defenders to explain why uttering (ii) is not at all 
bizarre. 
     In fact, one can conjoin (i) and (ii) (inserting a “but”) but one cannot conjoin (iii) 
or (iv) with any plausible reading of (ii):  
 
(v)      *Either Joe does not exist or Tony does not exist but while they are both 
violent criminals, Tony and Joe are also loving parents 
 
(vi)      *Comparing Joe and Tony involves a category mistake but while they are 
both violent criminals, Tony and Joe are also loving parents5 
 
If we choose to speak of two individuals being at different fictional levels we can still 
make sense of cross-level comparisons between them. Even though objects and 
individuals at different fictional levels do not interact (or meet), they may still have 
various noteworthy features in common.  
     There is another even more important reason why the fictional-level-construal (i) is 
superior to the deflationist and the category-mistake reading: There are fictions within 
fiction (and so on up). Fictional truth-operators of various kinds can be embedded into 
the scope of fictional truth-operators and statements about fictional levels should be 
sensitive to these embeddings. For example, we clearly want to affirm that  
 
(vii) Hamlet is not at the same fictional level as Gonzago 
 
because Gonzago is a merely fictional character in “The murder of Gonzago”, a play 
that is put on for the king in the play Hamlet. So the gap between the real world and 
the level of fiction is – as it were - echoed by a similar gap between subsequent 
                                                 
4
  The (one) nice feature of this deflationist reading is that it does not commit us to the existence of 
fictional beings – it just has to give us an analysis of negative existentials. But that is not a special 
commitment or burden of the deflationist – everyone who thinks that ‘Zeus does not exist’ is true owes 
some account of negative existentials.  
5
  (vi) reminds one of Moore’s paradox: p and I don’t believe that p 
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A 
fictional levels. Deflationism does not allow the sentence (iii) or any other sentence 
stating that a fictional character is not at the same level as a fictional character that is 
fictional within a fiction to come out true: Gonzago and Hamlet both don’t exist (and 
comparing them does not seem to involve a category mistake).  
     Objection: “Yes, granted, you can address multiple levels within your framework, 
but (i) is hardly assertable – saying that Bonanno and Soprano are not at the same 
fictional level seems to presuppose that Bonanno was at some fictional level – but he 
wasn’t – he was as real as one can be” 
     Again, I do not claim that (i) is a particularly commonsensical way of wording 
your gut reaction to the question “Did Tony Soprano meet Joe Bonanno?”   
The term “fictional levels” is clearly a technical term. If you think that real people are 
not really (pun intended) at any fictional level, you can be 
charitable and simply count the real world as being at fictional 
level 0, the ground level (a limiting case of any fictional level).  
This might seem a counterintuitive move, but maybe it is not 
any less intuitive than the common mathematical practice of 
classifying the circle A as an ellipse with eccentricity 0 and 
certainly not less intuitive than the common practice in first-
order logic to identify the class of propositional variables with 
the class of 0-ary relations. One might of course object that in those cases we have 
successful and extremely powerful theories or frameworks in the background 
(analytical geometry and FOL) and that application of the theories forces these 
particular identifications on us. And – the objection continues - we don’t have 
comparably strong theoretical commitments to any kind of half-baked theory on 
fictional levels – we are just groping around and guessing that there is something to 
the idea of multiple levels of fiction.  
     In response, let me say that I don’t think that it is that unnatural to view the real-
world as the ground level of any kind of fictional hierarchy – the epithet ‘fictional’ in 
(i) should not be charged with too much descriptive meaning – we just call the levels 
in a certain abstract structure ‘fictional levels’ because they are levels in a structure 
that describes fictional universes – in the same way we could call the levels in an 
organizational chart that describes the structure of a corporation (Excel Mobil, say) 
‘corporate levels’ because they are levels in that structure. The levels in question are 
neither intrinsically “fictional” nor intrinsically “corporate” (whatever it means for a 
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level to be intrinsically corporate) – they just specify a feature of certain structures 
that are used to describe or model fictions (or corporations).  
     There is one last worry about (i) that I wish to address. One might think that (i) is 
hostage to falsification by the facts in a way in which the original judgment “Tony 
Soprano and Joe Bonanno cannot meet - the one is fictional and the other one real” is 
not. (i) says that there is no fictional level that is shared between Soprano and 
Bonanno. But what if there turns out to be such a level after all?  
     For all we know, there are millions of amateur writers of fiction on this planet and 
some of them may well be churning out novellas on secret nightly encounters between 
Tony Soprano and Joe Bonanno. Would this not by itself establish that (i) is false? But 
if (i) could turn out to be false, how can it be a plausible construal of the response to 
our initial question (“Did Bonanno meet Soprano?”), which seems robustly true.  
     Two remarks are in order: First, (i) is a paraphrase of the response to the question 
– I am not claiming that it is equivalent to it in any interesting sense. Second, even if 
there should be some fictional persona called “Joe Bonanno” - created by that 
miraculously prolific author of novellas - one could still argue that the fictional 
persona is never strictly speaking identical with the real mobster and occurrences of 
the term “Joe Bonanno” within that novella would therefore fail to refer to the real Joe 
Bonanno. In fact, the view that fictionalized versions of real people are not strictly 
speaking identical with those people (but only something like counterparts) is natural 
given the framework of fictional hierarchies that I shall defend.  
     This last question shows that we have to flesh out the details of the proposed 
account. What are fictional levels?   
     The basic idea is very simple and is illustrated in Fig. 1 (p.8) – fictional universes 
(or worlds), whatever their ontology, have a hierarchical structure – they are multi-
level entities.  
     The level FL0 is the domain of all things that really exist and it is only a degenerate 
case of a fictional level. Generally speaking, the level FLn+1 is the domain of all things 
of which it is fictional at level FLn (and only at level FLn) that they exist. All the 
levels are generated by whatever makes things fictional in the real world (be it the 
implied author’s intentions, the audience’s attitudes, a combination of both etc.6).  
                                                 
6
  You can plug in your favorite account of the factor(s) that make(s) things fictional. Cf. Currie 
(1990), p. 18, on this very question.  
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     All the objects and individuals about which certain things are fictionally true in the 
real world exist at level FL1. So Hamlet, Ophelia and a fictional kingdom of Denmark 
are situated at that first level. All the objects and individuals about which things are 
fictionally true in the fictional universe FL1 exist at level FL2 – in the case of Hamlet, 
Gonzago is at FL2. 
     Complications arise if we wonder whether there is any criterion for being at the 
same level beyond what a given story entails. Very often a work of fiction is silent on 
the status of a given character within the hierarchy.  
     For example, are fictional narrators at the same level as the characters that they 
fictionally recount things about?  Sometimes such narrators are extradiegetic 
(Levinson), i.e. not really part of the story and not really located anywhere in the 
fictional universe. Are all the characters of a serial fiction at the same level, even if it 
seems to be understood in Season 5 that some of the things pictured in Season 1 never 
happened?7  These are challenging questions and I am tempted to respond that “level-
membership” may not always be fully determinate, especially for characters at the 
fringes of a fictional universe (like narrators) – At any rate, I do believe that fictional 
universes are intrinsically fuzzy (it is simply indeterminate whether some things are 
the case in a given universe, at any given level) so it will be – a fortiori- indeterminate 
what levels some characters belong too (this is why in Fig. 1 the lines marking the 
boundaries of the upper levels are dashed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
  Thanks to an anonymous referee for reminding me of this issue and giving me a number of other 
helpful suggestions 
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Level 0 
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III.  HIERARCHIES AND POSSIBLE WORLDS 
In this section I shall explore the question of how some versions of modal theories of 
fiction can meet the structural constraint on fictional universes (namely that they have 
to be hierarchically structured). Calling modal accounts “modal” may be misleading.  
 
Fig. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They are modal by association – their proponents claim that the model-theoretic 
resources that are used for the semantics of modal discourse can also be used 
(“recycled” as it were) for the semantics of fictional discourse. In other words, they 
subscribe to the following principle:  
 
(D) Whatever is fictionally true (in some work) is also true at some possible 
world(s) – the possible world(s) make it true 
 
Now, (D) is a very schematic principle: the exact import of (D) varies with one’s 
understanding of possible worlds (ranging from hard core Modal Realism to 
Ersatzism, according to which worlds are just sets of propositions or sentences) 
Also, defenders of (D) are not committed to claiming that there is a 1-1-
correspondence between possible worlds and fictional universes, i.e. that one world 
only is the truth maker for everything that is intuitively true in a given fictional 
universe (there might only be a correspondence between maximally consistent 
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fragments of a given fiction and possible worlds). Also, even if the work does not 
contain any inconsistencies, more than one possible world might be a fictional 
universe for a given fiction in the actual world (as we noticed above, works of fiction 
leave many things indeterminate, i.e. the question of how many freckles Emma 
Bovary has on her left cheek) 
     Now, I think that it is pretty obvious that defenders of a possible-world account of 
fiction had better endorse something along the lines of (D), for what - we may ask - is 
gained by identifying fictional worlds with possible worlds if the truths of fiction 
cannot be fully reduced to the truths at some (or more) possible worlds (after all, we 
postulate possible worlds because of their semantic roles of making certain statements 
true, not because we are so fond of the very idea of a metaphysical multiverse). But 
what about a statement like (i)? Are defenders of (D) committed to cash it out as 
(viii)?  
 
(viii) There is no possible world at which both Joe Bonanno and Tony Soprano 
exist 
 
Prima facie, (vii) seems problematic. Why shouldn’t there be possible worlds in 
which both Tony Soprano and Joe Bonanno happily coexist? If there is a world at 
which Tony Soprano exists (as principle (D) has it) and there is a world at which Joe 
Bonanno exists the actual world) why can’t we “patch together” those two worlds to 
get a third world in which they both exist?8 
     In response, defenders of (D) could postulate a special accessibility-relation that – 
at the actual world - selects those worlds that serve as fictional worlds for actual 
novels, movies, plays etc.  
     This (ternary) relation between a work of fiction, its “home” world and the world 
that it selects can be called fictional accessibility.  
     A possible world w is fictionally accessible (ƒ-accessible) from another world v 
with respect to a work of fiction x if w is a fictional universe for the work x in v, i.e. if 
w is apt to make the story x (and ideally nothing but the story x) true. ƒ-accessibility 
is neither reflexive, nor symmetric nor transitive.9 Once we postulate this special 
                                                 
8
  This presupposes something like David Lewis’ Principle of Recombination. Cf, Lewis (1986), p. 87 
9
  It is not reflexive because, for example, the actual world does not serve as a fictional world for any 
fiction (even though that might be disputed). It is not symmetric because even if w makes some fiction 
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accessibility-relation and fix two models M = 〈W, R, I〉 and its ƒ- variant Mƒ = 〈W, 
Rƒ, I〉  we have the following parallelism:  
 
(ix)      ‘It is possible that someone has three hands’ is trueM at w, iff there is a 
world v such that R(w, v) and ‘someone has three hands’ is trueM at v 
 
(x)       ‘It is Fictional in work x that someone has three hands’ is trueMƒ at w 
iff there is a world v such that Rƒ (w, x, v) and ‘someone has three hands’ 
is trueMƒ  at v with respect to x  
 
Let us now apply this new insight to (viii): Given the current approach, (viii) can be 
analyzed as: there is no ƒ-accessible world in which both Tony Soprano and Joe 
Bonanno exist.  
      Notice that this might be true even if there is a metaphysically possible world (call 
it u) in which both mobsters are “worldmates”10– but its mere existence does not 
make the world u a world of fiction, i.e. a world representing the universe of some 
fiction. We can put this a bit more formally by saying that ƒ-accessibility is not closed 
under recombination of domains – i.e. there are ƒ-accessible worlds w and v such that 
D is the domain of w and D* is the domain of v, but the world v+w whose domain is D 
∪ D* is not ƒ-accessible. Cross-level comparisons like (ii) can simply be read as 
cross-world comparisons (where at least one world is ƒ-accessible to the other one). 
     Finally, notice that what is ƒ-accessible with respect to a work varies from world to 
world (even if the work remains the same). People could have excelled in the 
narrative arts (or failed to do so) in many ways in which they haven’t actually done 
so. From a world in which Shakespeare died from meningitis at age 4 and no one else 
authored Hamlet, the world prescribed by the actual play Hamlet would not have been 
ƒ-accessible.  
     But there is a fly in the ointment: This refined possible-world account translates 
facts about fictional universes (conceived of as structured multi-layered entities) into 
                                                                                                                                            
in v true, w will not make any fiction in v true. And it is not transitive because what is fictionally 
fictional need not be fictional simpliciter.  
10
  Or – more cautiously –in order to not prejudge the question of whether fictional names are 
necessarily names of fictional beings – a world in which someone just like Tony Soprano and someone 
just like Joe Bonanno exists 
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facts about relations between possible worlds that lack the relevant kind of structure – 
and it does so at a clear cost – it does not seem to allow for any hierarchical structure 
of the worlds (Fig 1).  
     Recall that one of the fundamental ideas behind the intuitive “hierarchical” model 
pictured in Fig.1 was that the different levels up from the first level are all equally 
generated by the source of the fictional truths– all these fictional levels come in one 
big package, as it were and they are not separable into distinct possible worlds.  
One might think that we can still construct such packages by letting n-tuples of 
possible worlds play the role of fictional universes. The order given to those possible 
worlds could then be taken to encode the hierarchical (possibly open-ended) structure 
of the fictions.  
      But would imposing such a fixed, set-theoretically defined order do justice to the 
actual structure of fictional universes?  
     Not only are levels within a fictional hierarchy fuzzy, they are also pervious (at 
least the upper levels) – things that are fictionally fictional can become fictional 
simpliciter (movies such as “Stranger than fiction” or Woody Allen’s famous “The 
purple rose of Cairo” are good examples) and levels could also branch (things that are 
simply fictional can become fictionally fictional)11  
     Let us see how such a refined version of the possible-worlds account handles (i). 
Here is the closest paraphrase one can get:  
 
(xi)       There is no ƒ-accessible n-tuple of possible worlds (accessible from the 
actual world and some work of fiction) such that there is some world w in 
that package in which both Joe Bonanno and Tony Soprano exist. 
 
Notice that by quantifying over n-tuples of worlds (and defining accessibility-relation 
between arbitrary subsets of the set of all worlds) we are using a second-order 
framework – first-order theories lack the expressive resources to handle the 
hierarchical approach.   
                                                 
11
  However, on some views what is fictional can never really become actual because fictional beings 
(whatever they turn out to be) are essentially fictional.   
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     The simple intuition that is prompted in us by the question “Did Tony Soprano 
meet Joe Bonanno” has gained a suspicious quantificational complexity. It is not at all 
clear in what sense (i) and (xi) really amount to saying the same thing.  
     In this section, I have shown that fictional hierarchies impose constraints on modal 
theories of fictions and I have tentatively sketched a strategy for meeting this 
constraint. This is, however, just a beginning and many open questions remain. As so 
often, the devil is in the details.  
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